February 1998 but had not been disclosed to the defence or to any of the other medical witnesses. It had come to light only through the efforts of a lawyer who had not been satisfied with the verdict and who was acting pro bono for Sally.
This new evidence led to a review by the Criminal Cases Review Commission and a second appeal. That second appeal in 2003 was successful. The Court of Appeal said that, since there was evidence that was not before the jury that might have caused the jury to reach a different verdict on the count in respect of Harry, that verdict was unsafe and had to be Scheurer, in an article "Convicted on statistics?" (available at <www.understandinguncertainty.org>), says that, to the outside observer, the medical evidence in Sally Clark's trial was extremely complicated. There were a number of different medical issues debated by some nine specialists who reached different and contradictory conclusions. He suggests that what is striking about the case is that "within the sea of complexity, the staggering figure of one in 73 million stands out like a beacon of simplicity. Unfortunately for Sally Clark, far from being a lighthouse to the truth this figure managed the feat of being both irrelevant and wrong." quashed. 8 As a result, the Court said that no safe conclusion could be reached that
Christopher was killed unnaturally.
9
Her experience had, however, left Sally with major psychological and alcohol problems, Sally was freed from prison, after an incarceration of over three years. 10 and she died on 16 March 2007 of accidental acute alcohol poisoning, aged 42. Her third son was then aged only eight. Sally's case prompted a review of a number of other cases by the Attorney-General which resulted in other convictions being overturned.
11
It is probably true to say that, although the existence of the bacteria was the main reason for allowing the appeal, it is the statistical evidence given by Professor Meadow that became the focus of concern about this case. 12 It is therefore worth looking at how Professor Meadow calculated his odds. He started with the proposition that, for a family like the Clarks, 13 So why was he in error? The first mistake was that Professor Meadow's probability calculation methodology would only have been valid on the assumption that two SIDS deaths in the same family are independent of each other. the probability of a single SIDS death was one in 8,543. He calculated the probability of two SIDS deaths in the same family as around one in 73 million, that being 8,543 times 8,543.
14 There are very strong reasons for supposing that assumption is false. There may well be unknown genetic or environmental factors that predispose families to SIDS so that a second case within a family that has already suffered a SIDS death is much more likely than would be the case in another apparently similar family. 
13
A non-smoking household, with at least one waged income in the household, and the mother 27 years or older.
14 Hill, above n 12, at 325.
15
At 321-323.
Second, there is a real danger that the jury committed a statistical error known as the "prosecutor's fallacy". This fallacy consists of first showing that the "innocent" explanation for certain facts is highly improbable and then deducing guilt from that.
16
Professor Meadow should have assessed the probability of the alternative explanations -that the boys were victims of SIDS or that the deaths were caused by rare but natural causes missed by the pathologist performing the autopsies -and compared these explanations with the probability that a mother like Sally had murdered her first two children. Double murders by natural parents are very unusual and, indeed, one may think likely to be rarer than double SIDS.
That is the wrong approach. The relevant question is whether it is more likely that the deaths were natural than that they were deliberate.
17
In any event (and the third error), the probability of a child dying from SIDS from a family like the Clarks was in fact one in 1,300 and not one in 8,543.
If all this is taken into account, the probability of Sally's innocence was in fact quite high.
18
In the meantime, what are the lessons we can take from this tragic saga? The first is that
Professor Meadow was not a statistician. Nevertheless he was allowed to give statistical evidence in front of the jury. His evidence was not seriously challenged by defence counsel at trial and no contrary evidence was called from a defence statistician.
Professor Meadow had ignored a major risk factor for SIDS: the fact that both of the Clark babies were boys. 19 Further, the first appeal was unsuccessful, despite the statistical errors being brought to the Court's attention. EWCA 1390, Auld LJ commented that, when assessing the culpability of an expert witness accused of misconduct, all the circumstances must be considered including the emotional strain of testifying: "Not least … should be an appreciation of the isolation of an expert witness, however seasoned in the role, in the alien confines of the witness box in an adversarial contest over which the judge and the lawyers hold sway." Dr Alan Williams, the Home Office Pathologist who conducted the post-mortem examinations on both the Clark babies, also suffered consequences. He was banned from Home Office pathology work and coroner's cases for three years. The decision was upheld by the High Court. Those consequences to the doctors involved are obviously nothing like the trauma that Sally Clark It seems to me that it is is up to us as judges to ensure that expert witnesses stick to their areas of expertise. Statistical evidence should only be presented by those qualified to do so. This will not only be statisticians, of course, as many scientists (and especially forensic scientists)
will be familiar with the particular statistical techniques and probabilistic assessments in their field of expertise.
The second lesson is to ensure that we as judges have a basic understanding of probability and statistics and their uses and limitations. And that we encourage the counsel who appear in our courts to do the same.
21
The third is to ensure that, when statistical evidence is presented to a jury (or indeed to a judge alone in judge alone trials), it is presented in as simple a manner as possible and that it is properly explained, including the assumptions on which it is based and any qualifications to the evidence.
As judges, we need to make sure that vague phrases such as "consistent with", "cannot be excluded" and "could have come from" are explained. "Consistent with" for example usually seems to mean "not inconsistent with" and this concept is often useless unless the alternative explanations are also considered.
22
None of this is to suggest that statistical and probability evidence is not good evidence. Of course good statistical and probability evidence is very often the best evidence. Indeed, such evidence is becoming more and more important in our courts, DNA evidence being the most prominent example of this. And statistics can also provide real assistance for other types of evidence, such as shoeprint and glass fragment evidence by comparing, in statistical and probability terms, the likelihood of a guilty and innocent explanation for possible matches (often referred to as the "likelihood ratio").
As the Sally Clark story illustrates, even if an outcome is unlikely assuming innocence, it could conceivably be even more unlikely assuming guilt.
23
and her family suffered by her being wrongfully sent to prison or to the subsequent tragedy of her death but their professional (and probably personal) lives must have been adversely affected.
This type of evidence can be much more meaningful and fairer than assertions by experts of matches.
21
The Royal Statistical Society's Practitioner Guides, described above at n 12, are a useful tool in this regard. 26 It is fair to say that the main evidence relied on by the prosecution at trial was the ear print evidence and it appears from news reports that this was the first time ear print identification had been used successfully in evidence in England.
27
The first ear print expert at trial was a Dutch police officer who had specialised in ear print identification for some ten years but without formal qualifications or training. So what lessons do we take from this case? The first is that, even if there is not a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, the courts should take care, in cases of novel science in particular, to ensure that it has a sufficient scientific base to be admitted as expert evidence.
The Crown then abandoned the prosecution.
The second is that the witnesses should not have given evidence in such definite terms in what was at the least a technique in its very early days. Scientific method generally does not deal in certainties and witnesses should not suggest otherwise (or be pushed into it by counsel).
The third is that witnesses should be properly qualified. The Dutch police officer seems to have been working largely alone without peer review, validation, or formal qualifications or training.
The fourth (and somewhat contradictory point) is that, just because a form of evidence is not accepted by the establishment, does not mean it is invalid -it may be at the cutting edge and set to overtake old thinking. It has been shown for example that ears change shape depending on the temperature or how hard they are pressed on a surface. There was also a paucity of research into the technique which was in its infancy at the time of trial. David Bamber "Prisoners to appeal as unique 'earprint' evidence is discredited" The Telegraph (online ed, 2 December 2011 In summary, the NAS stated that, in terms of scientific basis, the analytically based disciplines (eg nuclear and mitochondrial DNA analysis, toxicology and drug analysis) generally hold a notable edge over disciplines based on expert interpretation (eg fingerprints, writing samples, tool marks, bite marks, and specimens such as hair): NAS Report, above n 34, at 7.
36
The NAS was highly critical of the competence of judges, lawyers and jurors, calling the courts "utterly ineffective" in apprehending and excluding poor expert evidence: NAS Report, above n 34, at 53.
Taking fingerprints as an example, the NAS said that there had been assumptions made without proper testing, for example that fingerprints are unique and do not change over time. 37 It also said that the matching process was so subjective that it could not be called scientific. 38 Further, there was inadequate training and validation of individual results. Since the report there has been more research conducted and better training and validation processes instituted in the United States. 39 So I am not suggesting (at least yet) that courts should be abandoning fingerprint evidence, but we do need to remember that it is not infallible.
40
The Mayfield case had a fascinating aftermath, which illustrates another point I want to make. An experiment was carried out in which a group of five international fingerprint examiners were each given a pair of prints they were told were from the Mayfield case.
41
There will also be "adversarial bias" arising from an expert's involvement in the adversarial system.
However, that was not the case. The two prints were from fingerprint sets that each examiner had in unrelated cases previously testified (under oath) were a conclusive match. Three out of the five examiners, thinking they were re-examining the flawed Mayfield prints, said that the prints did not match; one said he could not decide; and only one of the five said that the prints were a match. This experiment illustrates the dangers of an expert's judgment being influenced by prior expectations. This is called confirmation bias -the idea being that people see what they expect to see. Given fingerprint examiners will know they are comparing crime scene prints with those of a suspect and may know why the person is a suspect, they may be highly susceptible to the effects of confirmation bias. Some commentators have said that it is almost an "inevitable" consequence of the ecause forensic scientists are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency. A forensic analysis responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure -or have an incentiveto alter the evidence in a manner favourable to the prosecution".
46
As one commentator has suggested, "[p]ermitting cross-examination on these opposing views is as likely to polarise them further as it is to eliminate or reduce areas of difference": Davies, above n 43, at 377.
47
The Code of Conduct is contained in schedule 4 of the Judicature Act 1908. In addition to the Code of Conduct, expert witnesses with professional memberships may already be covered by some internal code of conduct or ethical standards 48 Whether such codes are enough to dispel more subtle and subconscious biases is another question. As some commentators have stated, while these types of codes "are impeccable normative ideals, experts who have been exposed to the direct and more subtle pressures of adversarial criminal proceedings might be forgiven for experiencing, if not total bewilderment, at least mild cognitive dissonance": P Roberts and A Zuckerman "Criminal Evidence" (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 509.
49
The manager from the more recent shooting (for which Mr Hinton was not charged) identified Mr Hinton from a photo line-up.
given in Court despite the fact that Mr Hinton had been working in a locked warehouse over 25 kilometres away at the time of the later robbery. 52 In fact, the bullets from the murders could not be matched to a single gun. When Anthony Hinton was freed among his first words were "the sun does shine".
53
Mr Hinton's case is a stark example of the reality that there is often an inequality of resources between the prosecuting state and a defendant. This disparity is compounded when the defendant is indigent and relies on limited state funding and resources to present a defence.
In many countries expert evidence is largely provided by the prosecution. There are issues with this, apart from disparity of resources. First, the prosecution "owns" the crime scene, controlling its investigation and possession of any evidence taken from it. Secondly, many forensic scientists are employed by the state, leading to the sort of bias issues discussed 50 Equal Justice Initiative "Equal Justice Initiative Wins Release of Anthony Ray Hinton" (2015) <www.eji.org>.
51
Hinton v Alabama 571 US -(2014).
52
In 2002, Mr Hinton's lawyers engaged three of the United States' top firearms examiners who testified that Mr Hinton's gun could not be matched to the crime evidence. Despite this, the prosecution refused at that stage to re-examine the case or concede error.
53
Equal Justice Initiative, above n 50.
earlier.
54

Concluding Thoughts
In addition, defence experts may not be available in a small jurisdiction and the state laboratories in these jurisdictions may be too small to be able to offer credible defence services, even if conflicts of interest could be managed.
This short paper has concentrated on miscarriages of justice arising, at least partly, from flawed expert testimony. The examples are not isolated ones. The Innocence Project reports that in more than 50 per cent of DNA exonerations cases, invalidated or improper forensic science contributed to the wrongful conviction.
55
But we must not lose sight of the very great assistance that forensic techniques provide, both in the investigation and successful prosecution of criminals. The message though is for courts to be vigilant in making sure proper standards are kept by experts giving evidence.
Even with proper vigilance, however, the reality is that flawed evidence may still be given.
This may be due to a particular expert's fallibility but may be because scientific knowledge has moved on. This points to the need for robust post-conviction processes to address miscarriages of justice.
The fallible and, sometimes, ephemeral nature of science was encapsulated by a United
States' State Court which said: "[s]cience moves inexorably forward and hypotheses or methodologies once considered sacrosanct are modified or discarded. The judicial system, with its search for the closest approximation to the 'truth', must accommodate this everchanging scientific landscape." Innocence Project "Wrongful Convictions Involving Invalidated or Improper Forensic Science that Were Later Overturned through DNA Testing" <www.innocenceproject.org>. As the NAS report, above n 34, noted at 42, "even those [forensic scientists] who are critical of the conclusions of The Innocence Project acknowledge that faulty forensic science has, on occasion, contributed to the wrongful conviction of innocent persons".
